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Successfully Defending Against 
 False Marking Claims 
By Steve Williams* & Jane Du**
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
¶1 Through its recent opinion in Forest Group Inc. v. Bon Tool Co.,1 the Federal 
Circuit has redefined the remedies available for a claim of false patent marking under 35 
U.S.C. § 292, and has given birth to a new breed of patent litigants.  Reversing decades of 
jurisprudence, Forest Group for the first time has interpreted the civil fine provision of 
§ 292 to impose a maximum fine of $500 per improperly marked article.2  Before Forest 
Group, the courts had applied the civil penalty to each continuous act of false marking.3  
The Federal Circuit’s new interpretation of the measure for imposing civil penalties under 
§ 292 exposes targeted defendants to liability for significant civil penalty judgments.  
Predictably, Forest Group has opened the door to a new wave of patent litigation.  Since 
January 1, 2010, already nearly two hundred cases claiming false marking of unpatented 
articles have been filed around the country, including forty-five such cases in the Eastern 
District of Texas.4  A majority of these suits are based on products marked with the 
numbers of expired patents.5
¶2 Although Forest Group has encouraged a bevy of new lawsuits under § 292, the 
path to large damage awards is far from easy.  A plaintiff must overcome several hurdles 
before he can establish liability against a company accused of falsely marking products.  
In order to succeed, a plaintiff must not only establish the marking of an incorrect or 
expired patent number but also intent by the marker to deceive the public.  Moreover, 
because of the fraud-like nature of § 292 false marking claims, at least one district court 
has held that intent to deceive must be pled with particularity because false marking is a 
fraud-based claim which is subject to the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b).
  This new breed of patent litigant preys on expired or 
expiring patents in hopes of reaping considerable damages from inattentive companies. 
6
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1 590 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
2 Id. at 1301. 
3 Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 646 F. Supp. 2d 790 (E.D. Va. 2009) (holding that an offense is only 
committed when a party makes a distinct decision to mark falsely). 
4 This figure is current up through May 17, 2010, based on a survey of case filings through 
www.docketnavigator.com. 
5 Whenever a patent is issued by the United States Patent & Trademark Office, it is assigned a unique 
number that can then be used to identify the patent.  See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURES 
(MPEP) 1309: ISSUE OF PATENT, available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/mpep_e8r5_1300.pdf. 
6 Juniper Networks v. Shipley, No. C 09-0696 SBA, 2009 WL 1381873, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 
2009).  Previously, the Eastern District of Texas and Middle District of Florida had both found that only 
notice pleading is necessary in a false marking case.  Astec America, Inc. v. Power-One, Inc., No. 6:07-cv-
464, 2008 WL 1734833, at *9 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2008) (holding defendant had cited no authority 
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In addition, the Federal Circuit has recently implied that the intent element of a false 
marking should be pled with particularity.7
II. BACKGROUND ON 35 U.S.C. § 292 
 
¶3 35 U.S.C. § 292(a) states: “Whoever marks upon, or affixes to, or uses in 
advertising in connection with any unpatented article, the word ‘patent’ or any word or 
number importing that the same is patented for the purpose of deceiving the 
public . . . [s]hall be fined not more than $500 for every such offense.”8  Section 292 has 
been identified as a qui tam statute.9  Qui tam originates from the Latin phrase qui tam 
pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur, which means “who pursues this 
action on our Lord the King’s behalf as well as his own.”10  The false marking statute is 
penal in nature, and the party bringing the action need not be a victim of the alleged 
wrong.11  Accordingly, a false marking claim may be prosecuted by anyone who can 
satisfy constitutional standing requirements.12  Any proceeds recovered by a private 
claimant through a false marking claim are divided evenly between the person and the 
United States.13  Claims for false marking are subject to a five-year statute of 
limitations.14
¶4 The marking provisions of the United States Code are intended to give the public 
notice of patent rights, but marking falsely without the support of a valid patent deprives 
the public of potential contribution. 
 
 
requiring claims for false marking to be pled with particularity, therefore plaintiff’s claim satisfied the 
threshold requirements for notice pleading); Third Party Verification, Inc. v. Signaturelink, Inc., 492 F. 
Supp. 2d 1314, 1327 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (holding there was no case law that required the Rule 9 level of 
pleading to claims for false marking).  Significantly, both of these cases were decided before Juniper 
Networks.  The Federal Circuit has not yet addressed this issue directly.  However, in light of Exergen 
Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2009), one can anticipate that the Federal Circuit 
may be favorably disposed to requiring false marking cases to be pled with particularity. 
7 Stauffer v. Brooks Bros., Inc., 2010 WL 3397419, at *6 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 31, 2010)  
(“We remand for the court to address the merits of the case, including Brooks Brothers' 
motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) ‘on the grounds that the complaint fails to state a 
plausible claim to relief because it fails to allege an “intent to deceive” the public—a critical 
element of a § 292 claim—with sufficient specificity to meet the heightened pleading 
requirements for claims of fraud imposed by’ Rule 9(b).”). 
8 35 U.S.C. § 292(a) (2006). 
9 Stauffer, 2010 WL 3397419, at *3 (“The Supreme Court, this court, and the Second Circuit have 
repeatedly treated it as such.  See Vermont Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 
U.S. 765, 768 n.1 (2000) (listing § 292(b) as one of four qui tam statutes currently in force”); see also, 
Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 608 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (referring to § 292 as a qui tam provision); 
Boyd v. Schildkraut Giftware Corp., 936 F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that § 292 is enforceable by a 
qui tam remedy). 
10 Stevens, 529 U.S. at 769 n.1. 
11 Pequignot, 646 F. Supp. 2d at 801. 
12 Brooks Brothers, 2010 WL 3397419, at *3. 
13 Id. at *1, quoting 35 U.S.C. § 292. 
14 Arcadia Mach. & Tool Inc. v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc., 786 F.2d 1124, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 1986) 
(holding a false marking action is subject to 28 U.S.C. § 2462, which imposes a 5 year statute of limitations 
on any action for the enforcement of any civil fine); Pequignot, 646 F. Supp. 2d at 793, n.3 (holding the 
statute runs backwards from the time suit is filed, meaning the plaintiff cannot sue based on any markings 
that occurred before 5 years prior to date of filing). 
N O RT H W EST ERN  J O U RN A L O F  T ECH N O LO G Y  A N D  IN T ELL ECT U A L PRO P ERT Y  [ 2 0 1 0  
 
 12 
¶5 Acts of false marking deter innovation and stifle competition in the marketplace.  If 
an article that is within the public domain is falsely marked, potential competitors may be 
dissuaded from entering the same market.  False marks may also deter scientific research 
when an inventor sees a mark and decides to forego continued research to avoid possible 
infringement.15
¶6  Those who falsely mark should not be permitted to take advantage of the marking 
statute and represent themselves as patent owners in the marketplace.  So great was 
Congress’s interest in preventing false marking that it enacted § 292 as a qui tam statute 
to encourage individuals to bring suit. 
 
III. ELEMENTS OF A FALSE MARKING CLAIM 
¶7 To prevail on a false marking claim, a plaintiff must establish two elements: that 
the defendant (1) marked a patent number on an unpatented article (2) with intent to 
deceive the public.16
A. Marking of an Unpatented Article 
 
¶8 With respect to the first element, an “unpatented article” is an item that “is not 
covered by at least one claim of each patent with which the article is marked.”17  An 
article is considered unpatented when “no patent, foreign or domestic, is pending or has 
been issued for it or for a portion of it; or when any of the patents asserted on its behalf 
do not in fact cover it; or when any patent which once covered it has expired.”18
B. With Intent to Deceive the Public 
  Thus, a 
product that was once labeled and protected under a valid patent becomes “unpatented” 
once that patent expires.  If the manufacturer or seller continues to mark its “unpatented 
articles” with the expired patent number, he is susceptible to a § 292 suit. 
¶9 The second element—intent to deceive the public—pays tribute to the statute’s 
purpose of preventing fraud.  The courts are clear that § 292 is not a statute of strict 
liability.19  “Intent to deceive is a state of mind arising when a party acts with sufficient 
knowledge that what it is saying is not so and consequently that the recipient of its saying 
will be misled into thinking that the statement is true.”20  Accordingly, an honest mistake 
that results in mismarking a product will not trigger liability.21
¶10 Knowledge that a product has been falsely marked serves as proof of intent to 
deceive.  While intent is subjective in nature, the law allows intent to be established by 
objective criteria.  “Thus, ‘objective standards’ control and the ‘fact of misrepresentation 
coupled with proof that the party making it had knowledge of its falsity is enough to 
 
 
15 Forest Group Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., 590 F.3d 1295, 1302–03 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). 
16 Id. at 1300. 
17 Clontech Lab., Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., 406 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
18 CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 40786, QUI TAM: AN ABBREVIATED LOOK AT THE 
FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND RELATED FEDERAL STATUTES 4 (2009). 
19 Clontech, 406 F.3d at 1352. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
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warrant drawing the inference that there was a fraudulent intent.’”22  Knowledge of the 
falsity must be established by a preponderance of the evidence that the accused party did 
not have a reasonable belief that the articles were properly marked.  Absent proof of the 
lack of reasonable belief, there can be no liability under § 292.  The Federal Circuit in 
Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co. has adopted the Clontech standard23 that an inference of intent 
depends on “whether [the plaintiff] proved by a preponderance of the evidence that [the 
defendant] did not have an honest good faith belief in marking its products . . . .”24
¶11 The presumption of intent can be rebutted by the defendant with a showing of good 
faith.  However, “the mere assertion by a party that it did not intend to deceive will not 
suffice to escape statutory liability.”
  The 
Clontech opinion is the key legal authority for evaluating intent to deceive under § 292. 
25  The defendant must provide actual evidence.  
“Whether evidence suffices to rebut the presumption turns on a fact-specific examination 
of the defendant’s conduct.”26
IV. CASES INVOLVING EXPIRED PATENTS GIVE RISE TO A WEAKER PRESUMPTION 
 
¶12 According to the Eastern District of Virginia, the regular notice pleading that can 
get a plaintiff into court on a false marking claim will not furnish the same presumption 
of intent in the case of expired patents.  In Pequignot, the court held that when “false 
markings at issue are expired patents that had previously covered the marked products, 
the Clontech presumption of intent to deceive is weaker, because the possibility of actual 
deceit, as well as the benefit to the false marker, is diminished.”27  One rationale behind 
the weaker inference is that anyone can look up the patent and see that the expiration date 
has passed, reducing the likelihood of deception.28
¶13 Based on Pequignot, the presumption of intent in cases involving expired patents is 
a half-step down from the standard Clontech presumption.  “[A]lthough some 
presumption of deceptive intent exists when a product is knowingly marked with an 
expired patent, that presumption is weaker than when a product is marked with an 
unexpired patent that does not cover the product.”
   
29  Of course, if someone falsely marks 
an article with an expired patent with actual intent to deceive, § 292 is violated.30
¶14 It logically follows that a weakened presumption of intent should be rebuttable with 
a lesser showing of good faith.  For example, in Pequignot, the defendant was a 
manufacturer of disposable flatware that marked its plastic cup lids with a patent that had 
been expired for nine years.  An application of the Clontech standard of review led to a 
weakened presumption of intent even though the Defendant admitted it knowingly 
marked its lids.  The cup lids were produced by stamping machines using mold cavities 
that were expensive to replace.  At trial, evidence showed that Solo Cup was advised by 
its attorneys that it was permissible to continue stamping its products with the existing 
 
 
22 Id. (citing Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 795–96 (C.C.P.A. 1970)). 
23 Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 608 F.3d 1356, 1363–64 (Fed Cir. 2010). 
24 Clontech, 406 F.3d at 1355. 
25 Id. at 1352. 
26 Pequignot, 646 F. Supp. 2d at 797 (quotation and citation omitted). 
27 Id. at 797–98 (emphasis added). 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 798. 
30 Id. at 798 n.15. 
N O RT H W EST ERN  J O U RN A L O F  T ECH N O LO G Y  A N D  IN T ELL ECT U A L PRO P ERT Y  [ 2 0 1 0  
 
 14 
mold and expired patent number so long as it took reasonable steps to replace the cavities 
over time and did not otherwise manifest an intent to deceive the public.31  There was 
also evidence that Solo Cup had implemented a business plan to replace the mold cavities 
as the existing ones wore out.  The replacements would have the expired patent number 
removed.  Accordingly, Solo Cup successfully rebutted the presumption of intent by 
showing that it relied in good faith on the advice of counsel and that it acted out of a 
motive to reduce costs and business disruptions, and not for the purpose of deceiving the 
public.32
V. NEW FOCUS ON DAMAGES 
  The Pequignot standard effectively raises the bar for plaintiffs to succeed in 
false marking cases involving expired patents by lowering the threshold for defendants to 
defeat the presumption of intent. 
¶15 35 U.S.C. § 292 states the plaintiff shall recover “not more than $500 for every 
such offense.”33
¶16 In Pequignot, the Court adopted Solo’s position of a single fine per continuous act 
of false marking, which the court considered supported by the majority of case law 
addressing damages under § 292.  In support of its argument, the court cited the seminal 
case of London v. Everett H. Dunbar Corp., “[A] plaintiff, in order to recover more than 
a single penalty, must go further than to prove the marking of a number of unpatented 
articles.  The proof must be sufficiently specific as to time and circumstance to show a 
number of distinct offenses . . . .”
  Historically, “every offense” was interpreted as a continuous act of false 
marking, which did not make a sizeable recovery for qui tam plaintiffs.  As recently as 
the Pequignot case, courts have awarded only one fine for each continuous act or each 
distinct decision to falsely mark. 
34
¶17 The Federal Circuit abandoned this long-held approach in Forest Group when it 
reinterpreted “every offense” to apply to every falsely marked article.  “The statute 
requires a fine to be imposed for every offense of marking any unpatented article.  The 
act of false marking is the offense punished by the statute . . . [therefore] the statute 
clearly requires that each article that is falsely marked with intent to deceive constitutes 
an offense under 35 U.S.C. § 292.”
 
35
¶18 In departing from the hundred-year-old ruling in London, that a single fine should 
be imposed per continuous act of false marking, the Federal Circuit explained that the 




31 Id. at 793–94. 
  The original false marking law imposed a minimum 
penalty of $100.  Congress amended § 292 in 1952 to allow a maximum fine of $500.  At 
the time of the London decision, the $100 minimum penalty would make application on a 
per article basis inequitable.  If a defendant who was found to have falsely marked 
products had manufactured a large number of inexpensive products, then being assessed 
with a penalty of at least $100 per article could drive many such defendants out of 
32 Id. at 798. 
33 35 U.S.C. § 292 (2006). 
34 Pequignot, 646 F. Supp. 2d at 801 (citing London v. Everett H. Dunbar Corp., 179 F. 506, 508 (1st 
Cir. 1910)) vacated in part as moot, 608 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
35 Forest Group, Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., 590 F.3d 1295, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
36 Id. 
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business.  Now, district courts have the discretion to assess the per article fine in any 
amount not to exceed $500 to enable the court to fashion a penalty that is sufficiently 
punitive for the defendant to remove improper patent numbers from future products 
without risking its complete bankruptcy.  In light of the distinction, “Congress’[s] 
affirmative change of the statute’s penalty from a minimum to a maximum fine 
eliminated the policy consideration expressed by the court in London of not imposing 
disproportionate fines for the false marking of small and inexpensive articles.”37  The fact 
that § 292 provides for qui tam actions supports the Federal Circuit’s construction.38  
Splitting a single fine of $500 with the government would not provide sufficient financial 
motivation for plaintiffs who incur the enormous expense of patent litigation.  In 
addition, a single fine per continuous act of false marking has little deterrent effect on the 
wrongdoer and would render the statute ineffective.39
VI. CONCLUSION 
  As a consequence, § 292 now 
presents a potentially serious financial burden to companies that inadvertently continue to 
mark products with numbers from expired patents. 
¶19 The courts are beginning to witness an explosion of new false marking cases in the 
wake of the Federal Circuit’s recent ruling in Forest Group.  However, while the court 
has made false marking cases potentially more lucrative, prospective plaintiffs 
considering filing such cases, particularly ones based on expired patents, should realize 
that their path is strewn with hurdles that may be difficult to overcome.  Plaintiffs must 
show the products were falsely marked and the defendants knew of the falsity.  The 
inference of intent to deceive is then subject to rebuttal by a wide array of good faith 
evidence by the defendant.  Plaintiffs will have particular difficulty in the case of expired 
patents in which the presumption of fraudulent intent is weaker—as in the case of expired 
patents. 
¶20 Finally, even if the plaintiff is able to obtain a judgment of false marking, the 
rewards may not be as great as expected.  In its decision to impose § 292 fines on a per 
article basis, the Federal Circuit cautioned: “By allowing a range of penalties, the statute 
provides district courts the discretion to strike a balance between encouraging 
enforcement of an important public policy and imposing disproportionately large 
penalties for small, inexpensive items produced in large quantities.”40
 
  Thus, defendants 
should be prepared to vigorously defend any false marking claim, challenge the 
presumption of intent to deceive, and show that in the event the false marking statute is 
violated, any penalty should be meted out in proportion with the low margins typically 
associated with mass produced, inexpensive articles. 
 
37 Id. at 1302. 
38 Id. at 1304. 
39 Id. at 1303. 
40 Id. at 1304. 
